Human Immortality II

See Human Immortality.

"Matter, then, is held to be extended, to have position, and to be capable of motion independently of observation. It is also impenetrable - that is, no two pieces of matter can occupy the same position in space. But it has no colour, it is neither hard nor soft, it has no taste, no smell, and no sound." (p. 22)

When searching for an external cause of our sensations, McTaggart writes:

"A reality which exists independently of me need not be matter - it might, for example, be another spirit. We do not call anything matter unless it possesses the primary qualities of matter given above." (p. 30)

We do call something matter even if it does not possess the primary qualities given above. Mass is a form of energy. Macroscopic objects are composed of empty spaces and forces between subatomic particles whose properties differ qualitatively from those of macroscopic objects. Lenin argued in Materialism and Empirio-criticism that:

philosophically, "matter" just means that which pre-existed consciousness and which continues to exist independently of consciousness;

the properties of "matter" (a more neutral term is "being") are to be discovered by empirical science, not by philosophy;

any scientific account is only provisional because there is always more to be discovered.

Contemporary science seems to confirm this last proposition.

"Causes do not necessarily resemble their effects." (ibid.)

I agree. The world as described by physics is not as we perceive it. Necessarily, we perceive discrete objects separated by apparently empty spaces whereas the reality is a continuum of electromagnetic radiation and gravitational waves. But it remains "matter" in Lenin's sense of being that pre-existed and determines consciousness, indeed that has become conscious.