“Many
of those who say that they dislike Milton’s God only mean that they dislike God:
infinite sovereignty de jure, combined with infinite power de facto,
and love which, by its very nature, includes wrath also – it is not only in
poetry that these things offend.” 1
Thanks
for the judgementalism but let’s consider “God.”
(1) The
creator before the creation would be a self without other which is like a square
without sides. Self is recognized only by contrast with other, thus with
external objects of consciousness. Consciousness, a relationship between a
subject and its objects, is negated by the negation of the objects. If there
were a single being, then it would become self-conscious only by first
appearing to itself as other, then realizing its identity. The creation of a
perceived world of discrete objects separated by apparently empty spaces
necessarily preceded self-consciousness, not vice versa.
The
complete process would be: reality; appearance; illusion; realization.
Realization is the ending of illusion, which is appearance mistaken for reality,
but reality, even if single, must also be internally dynamic because a static
unity would be unable to differentiate itself. Individuals perceive objects;
scientists study dynamics; mystics realize unity; theists personify unity.
The
problem of self-consciousness before the creation is not solved by suggesting
that a timeless creator does not literally preexist his creation. He must exist
independently of it and this is enough to make him potentially a subject without
objects.
(2) God
is believed to be bodiless. An embodied subject identifies itself with one of
its objects and therefore can think “I perceive my body and other objects”
whereas a bodiless subject without an environment would have nothing to think
about. It would be a form without content. Mental properties like knowledge,
wisdom, goodness etc, require a context. They are applicable to knowable objects
and to discernible, i. e., embodied, other subjects but not to nothing.
Goodness is a disposition to act in a particular way towards other beings who
therefore necessarily preexist it.
(3) God
is believed to be self-conscious yet timeless. However, external objects,
necessary for self-consciousness, are conceived to be external only when they
are re-perceived, recognized and regarded as having continued to exist even
while not being perceived. “I saw that before” presupposes that “I” and “that”
have continued to exist independently of each other since the remembered
perception. This requires memory, thus the experience of having lived through a
period of time.
A
single moment of consciousness with no past or future would begin and end
simultaneously, thus would be indistinguishable from unconsciousness. God is
believed not to begin and end simultaneously but to be beginningless and
endless. However, this implies infinite, not zero, time. Timeless consciousness,
the temporal equivalent of a mathematically flat plane, is an abstraction
whereas the Biblical deity is presented as a concrete individual, with specific
characteristics, YHWH, not Baal, acting in history.
(4)
Persons, self-conscious individuals, exist only in interpersonal relationships.
The Trinity doctrine seems to answer this requirement. However, the doctrine was
formulated in order to preserve monotheism despite the deification of God’s son
and the personification of his spirit, not in order to explain pre-existent
personality, and it raises the additional problem of differentiating between
persons who are not spatially distinct. (Similarly, patriarchal monotheism
precludes female deities so Mary became not a Mother Goddess but the Mother of
God, which sounds like the same thing until it is elucidated.)
(5)
Lewis thought that divine existence was logically necessary. However,
existential propositions, like “God exists,” are contingent, not tautologous.
God’s properties can neither include nor entail existence because existence is
not a property but the instantiation of properties. If perfection did entail
existence, then a perfect example of every kind of thing for which there is a
criterion of perfection would necessarily exist. Empirical research would locate
the perfect person, poem, potato etc.
(6) The
omnipotent creator of all things other than himself would create all the
determinants of our choices and us making those choices and therefore could not
consistently condemn us for making such choices. If choices are not determined,
then they are random, therefore not morally significant, and God does not create
all things other than himself. Because interacting dispositions and
circumstances determine behavior, we are morally accountable to fellow
creatures who try to influence our behavior, but not to a hypothetical creator
of all our dispositions and circumstances. Fellow beings can advocate courage or
honesty. Our creator could have made us brave or honest.
A
father (or ruler) can either allow or prevent his child’s (or subject’s) freedom
of choice because he is a more powerful being sharing a common environment
governed by regular laws which neither of them created. However, the infinitely
powerful creator of us and our environment has already made us the people we
are, making the choices we do. He neither allows nor prevents freedom of choice
but determines choices. Many theists are, consistently, predestinationists.
People
are most predictable when unconstrained. A careful man is one who usually acts
carefully. He can act uncharacteristically and unpredictably because we do not
know all the factors determining his behavior. God not only knows but creates
them. He need not even predict because:
“…God
did not create the universe long ago but creates it at this minute – at every
minute.” 2
Thus,
he creates us doing whatever we are doing at every moment.
I agree
with Lewis that:
divine
omniscience would not negate human free will because merely knowing what someone
does does not make him do it;
eternal
omniscience is not temporal prescience;
even
prescience would not make anyone do anything.
If a
man does A, then it would have been foreknown that he was going to do A. If he
does B, then it would have been foreknown that he was going to do B.
Foreknowledge that he was going to do B if he in fact does A is logically
impossible as is subsequent knowledge that he did B if he in fact did A.
However:
eternal
omniscience is timeless consciousness, which I do argue is impossible;
I have
also argued that omnipotent creation prevents creatures’ freedom in relation to
their creator.
(7)
Lewis’ defense of theism is invalid. He argues that merely caused beliefs are
true only by accident whereas valid inferences are reasoned, not caused, and
that an act of knowing must be determined only by what is known, not by past
events. He infers that a beginningless “Reason” frees our inferences and acts of
knowing from causation. Natural thoughts are at best associative whereas
inferential thought is divinely illumined, thus “supernatural.” 3
Reason
preceding language and an environment sounds like a square preceding its sides.
If an apparent act of knowing is caused only by a series of events acting
directly on a conscious being, then there is not necessarily any external object
or state of affairs corresponding to what that being seems to know, but, if the
series of events brings the subject and object of knowledge into contact, then
it does cause the act of knowing.
Conscious organisms are not, like inanimate objects, mere passive recipients of
causal determination. Animals process sensory inputs and act accordingly. When
our pre-human ancestors began to manipulate and thus to experiment with their
environment, their cerebral capacity increased accordingly. Lewis writes:
“…expectations are not inferences and need not be true. The assumption that
things which have been conjoined in the past will always be conjoined in the
future is the guiding principle not of rational but of animal behavior. Reason
comes in precisely when you make the inference ‘Since always conjoined,
therefore probably connected’ and go on to attempt the discovery of the
connection.” 4
But an
environment-manipulating, data-processing, language-using animal, competitively
compelled to learn, possessing greater cerebral capacity than other species and
already capable of associative thought would be able to make the qualitative
leap from mere expectation to attempted discovery. It would begin to anticipate
the outcomes of its actions and to adjust its expectations to experience.
Lewis
rightly argues that improved vision is not knowledge of light and that improved
curiosity or expectation are not inference but ignores the roles of
manipulation, cerebral data-processing and qualitative transformation:
organismic sensitivity quantitatively increased until it was qualitatively
transformed into conscious sensation;
processing of immediate sensations quantitatively increased until it was qualitatively transformed into perception of discrete objects;
the transition from passive expectation through active curiosity to experimental manipulation is another such qualitative transformation.
processing of immediate sensations quantitatively increased until it was qualitatively transformed into perception of discrete objects;
the transition from passive expectation through active curiosity to experimental manipulation is another such qualitative transformation.
The brain evolved with the hands, reflection with action,
theory with practice, mind with body.
When
Lewis criticizes his philosophical opponents for being unable to explain how a
thought can be both caused by previous events and grounded in another thought,
he argues that it is insufficient to suggest that the grounding thought is one
of the previous events because no thought causes all the thoughts that can be
inferred from it. This is because, when we think a thought, not being mere
intellects, we have more to attend to than tracing all its implications. We
attend to what concerns or interests us if we are not distracted by more urgent
sensory inputs. Once, I was so disturbed by a particular event that it took me
two days to realize one of its obvious implications.
Lewis
distinguishes sharply between causally determined rationalizations and
timelessly valid rationality but surely they are almost inextricably entangled
in practice? Many influences prevent most people from reasoning systematically
though not from drawing common sense inferences about everyday events. When we
do achieve circumstances that enable us to attempt systematic reasoning, then
our premises, procedures and probable conclusions are strongly influenced by
economics, education etc. A skeptical theologian informs me that, because
British University Theology Departments are mainly staffed by people who already
accept the tenets of Christianity, they continue to accept evidence for the
Resurrection that would not be accepted in History, Sociology, Philosophy or any other
academic discipline. Wider recruitment to the study of Biblical texts would
change the theological consensus.
A
billionaire’s social circumstances and self-interest usually cause him to
rationalize capitalism but, in order to do this, he pays experts to analyze
relevant evidence and to generate arguments that some regard as valid but others
as invalid and that must be considered as arguments, not dismissed as
rationalizations. Controversy and experience force the intellectually honest to
test and change their ideas and some agreed truths have emerged.
I
know
that 1+1=2 not because I have been caused to believe it whether or not
it is
true but because biological and social causation have produced in me a
level of consciousness that can apprehend simple mathematical truths
when they are
presented to it. Systematic rationality and abstract understanding in
logic,
mathematics and science have been won in struggle against concrete
nature and
scriptural authority.
Any
process of reasoning is expressed in a set of mutually consistent propositions,
at least some of which should be testable against experience. When we want to
discredit someone’s reasoning, we try to show that his propositions contradict
experience, each other or both. Our wish to discredit him may be irrational.
Prejudice may blind us to the truth of his statements. We may respond
emotionally to a single word instead of listening carefully to an entire
sentence. We may interrupt and simply not hear out a valid argument to its
conclusion. We may either not understand an argument or continue to disagree
with it even when we do understand it. However, we at least pay lip
service to rationality whenever we criticize inconsistency. Consistency between
propositions, necessary for communication, is the basis of the “reason” which
Lewis argues preceded communication.
Lewis
argues that a thought resulting from anything other than an earlier thought has
no rational basis. However, my thought that the sun is hot follows only from my
experience of the sun and my ability to think. The latter has not always
existed. Lewis’ conclusion that its existence depends on an ability to think
that has always existed does not follow from his mistaken premise that
rational thought must be beginningless first because an ability to think is not
a particular thought and secondly because God’s thoughts are not mine. An
additional argument is necessary to show how thoughts of mine that do not follow
from earlier thoughts of mine can instead follow from earlier thoughts of an
invisible being. This is not obvious. My thoughts follow from yours only if you
tell me them and I agree with them.
Lewis’
philosophical opponents have not “…given an account of what we thought to be our
inferences that suggests that they are not real insights…” or treated reason as
a mere phenomenon. 5 Intellect was naturally selected because
it enhances life by enabling us to understand natural processes. We do
not first find that our insights are useful, then have to prove that they are
insights. Inferential ability selected for survival can now be used for more
dispassionate research just as opposable thumbs selected for grasping branches
can now be used to write philosophy.
Lewis
is simply wrong to imply that human loves are valueless if they are biological
by-products. They remain human loves, whatever their physical basis. An electric
bulb is not valueless because its light source is natural. Why would human
ideals be illusions if they had not, somehow, preexisted humanity? 6
Lewis
approvingly quotes Haldane:
“If my
mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I
have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true…and hence I have no reason
for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms.” 7
Atomic
motions in my brain are a scientifically detectable aspect of me as perceived by
others. My mental processes are my perceptions of everything else. Of course
atomic motions and mental processes differ qualitatively and neither simply
causes the other. Dialectical materialists recognize emergent, irreducible
levels of being linked by qualitative transformations but Lewis replies only to
mechanistic reductionism. (See Zen Marxism) Dialectical materialists say not “Only atoms exist”
but “Atoms and reason are two levels of being.” Lewis mentions the concept of
emergent deity but confuses the emergence of new qualities with reduction to
previously existing qualities, thus does not really consider “emergence.” 8
He
concludes that “…the human mind…is set free…” from causation.
“And
the preliminary processes which led up to this liberation, if there were any,
were designed to do so.” 9
There
were natural processes that led up to human mentality and they explain
it. Any design argument for theism needs to be empirical, not a priori.
An evolutionary account of the origin of human reason is no more an absurd or
nonsensical proof that there are proofs than is the theistic account. We do not
prove that there are proofs but explain how there are beings that can understand
them.
If God
exists, then he is another rational subject, not objective rationality. The
latter comprises facts such as that, whenever there are countable items, then
one plus one always equals two. 1 + 1 = 2 need not have been thought before the
creation and, even if it had been, that thinking of it would not have been what
made it valid.
References
- C. S. Lewis, A Preface To Paradise Lost (London: Oxford University Press, 1942, 1967), p. 118.
- C. S. Lewis, Miracles (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1947; London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 2002). P. 288.
- ibid, pp. 17-60.
- ibid, p. 30.
- ibid, p. 32-332.
- ibid, p. 54.
- ibid, p. 22.
- ibid, pp. 45-46.
- ibid, pp. 34-35.
http://www.scifiwright.com/2016/02/empire-of-lies/comment-page-1/#comment-125169
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ReplyDeleteI am pleased to see an original argument in favor of atheism on your blog: the argument that a being outside or before the universe could not have consciousness because he encounters no sensory objects of consciousness is one I have never heard any other atheist aside from me to say. Well done.
ReplyDeleteYour opening is weak: you rebuke CS Lewis’s observation that if you do not like the Milton’s idea of God it is because you dislike the idea of God per se. You then go on, after sneering at Lewis, to rebuke the idea of God per se, actually proving his point.
The arguments (1) no self without other (2) no thought without body (3) no consciousness without time, all suffer the same conceptual limitation: they presuppose that the mind of God is like the mind of men and has the same limitations to the causes of thought processes as men do. Anyone not already convinced that the mind of God is like the mind of man will not be convinced by an argument which points out a limitation in human thinking and attributes it to God.
Argument (4) no persons without other persons suffers from the same limitation, and the additional limit that Christian notions of the Trinity assert all three persons of the trinity existed from eternity, and that therefore the Christian God, at least, has never suffered the isolation in which no self awareness is possible.
Argument (5) that God is contingent is both a clever argument, and a gratuitous assertion. All mainstream Christian theology concludes that the word ‘God’ is not meaningful unless it applies to a necessary being. The statement ‘God exists’ if God is defined as ‘The being who necessarily must exist in order for any contingent beings to exist’ is in fact a necessary and not a contingent statement. The conclusion about the perfect example of all things existing does not necessarily follow, and, in any case, if he perfect example exists as a Platonic form, or as an idea in the mind of God, or existed once in Eden before the fall, this criterion is satisfied. It is argumentum ad ignorantiam to argue that the perfect man or perfect potato does not exist because you have yet to see him.
Argument (6) is merely a misstatement of the nature of choice.
Continued below
Argument (6) is merely a misstatement of the nature of choice.
ReplyDeleteThe argument you give with no number that God continually creates the universe is based on an assumption of Mohammedan theology Christians do not share (we believe in secondary causes), and, again, simply assumes that the author of the universe cannot take into account and allow his characters freely to choose their own ultimate fate. If an allpowerful being has all power, one of his powers is the power to give power to another being and let him do with it what he will.
Argument (7) is not rigorous enough to bear refuting. Lewis says reason is the perception of a non-physical connection, such as the law of cause and effect (a law which cannot be seen with the eye) bridging two physical events, the physical cause and the physical effect. The difference between animal and man, says Lewis, is that while an animal can develop a habit or reflex associating a given cause with a given effect, only man can perceive the connecting reality, which is nonphysical and timeless. The rebuttal to this is simply a denial that this is so.
The argument merely treats with reason in a sloppy, offhand way. Argument (7) is merely a series of gratuitous statements that deny the paradox involved with materialism, namely, that if thoughts are the sole byproduct of nondeliberate irrational atomic processes in our brains, they can have neither truth value nor meaning. The analogy between a lightbulb and love is an irrelevant analogy: the better analogy would be to say that if an Asimov Robot is programmed to protect human owners, the protective emotion the robot allegedly feels is just as valuable as if the robot had free will and had freely consented to love his owner.
“There were natural processes that led up to human mentality and they explain it. ”
This statement is simply false. All natural processes can be reduced to expression of fundamental units: mass, length, duration, temperature, current, candlepower, moles of substance. No symbol, not even the simplest, which expresses a quality can be expressed in terms of those seven unit measurements or any combination thereof, for the same reason that no addition of merely horizontal inches can raise one inch vertically.
Symbols are a relation between thought and object such that a symbol can be true or false, accurate or inaccurate, just or unjust, fair or ugly, and so on.
These concepts, true, just, fair, are fundamental qualities and cannot be reduced to any expression such as “Truth is when one gram of substance moving at one second per second strikes another gram to produce one degree Celsius of heat.” Whereas emergent properties, such as color or density, can be expressed in these terms. The wavelength of a stop light can be measured precisely: the idea that red “means” stop cannot be measured because “means” means a meaning.
But all natural processes can be measured and reduced to these fundamental units; human reasoning, abstractions, and symbols cannot be; therefore human reasoning is not a natural process.
Gentlemen,
ReplyDeleteNot being a philosopher myself, merely one who respects real philosophy, I'm very glad to see Mr. Wright commenting in this blog. I had more than once recommended his blog to Dr. Shackley.
Sean M. Brooks